A Linha Tênue entre Gerenciamento de Resultados e Fraudes Corporativas
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17524/repec.v18i2.3315Palavras-chave:
Gerencimamento de Resultados, Fraudes Corporativas, Demonstrações FinanceirasResumo
Objetivo: Investigar se em períodos anteriores a fraudes corporativas ocorre aumento no volume de gerenciamento de resultados.
Método: Foram analisadas três diferentes amostras: Amostra 1, contendo todas as empresas não financeiras listadas no Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão (B3); Amostra 2, contendo companhias condenadas por fraude; e Amostra 3, com pareamento entre companhias fraudulentas e não fraudulentas. Para a Amostra 1, foi realizada a regressão Logit para dados em painel; para a 2, foi realizada uma análise descritiva por quartis; e para a 3, foram realizados Z score de Altman, teste U de Mann-Whitney e análise gráfica.
Resultados: De modo geral, demonstram que as empresas que se envolveram em fraudes gerenciam mais do que aquelas que não se envolveram, porém não foi possível identificar o período exatamente anterior ao cometimento da fraude.
Contribuições: A pesquisa apresenta contribuições para organizações e seus respectivos gatekeepers. Podem ser citadas como inovações da pesquisa desenvolvida em relação aos estudos predecessores: (i) propostas diferentes variáveis e modelagens; (ii) pioneirismo no contexto nacional; (iii) promoção de reflexões sobre o impacto da concorrência entre informações fidedignas e qualidade dos lucros.
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