Empirical evidence of factors that influence the approval of the executive compensation package by shareholders
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17524/repec.v16i1.2959Keywords:
Executive Compensation, Voting, ActivismAbstract
Objective: To analyze the factors determining the probability of approval of the executive compensation package by institutional investors of Brazilian companies listed on B3.
Method: The survey was conducted on 771 shareholder votes in the resolutions of the Annual and Extraordinary General Meetings (AAGOE), from January to April 2019, of Brazilian companies listed on B3. Data collection was performed manually and sought information in reference forms, shareholding positions, management proposals, minutes of general meetings, final analytical and synthetic voting maps. The data obtained were analyzed using logistic regressions.
Results: It shown that the total executive compensation is positively related to the approval of the executive compensation package by the shareholders, which indicates an alignment between institutional investors and executive compensation. Another result indicated that executives may be focusing on long-term performance and acting as owners to maximize company value.
Contributions: The results contribute both to the literature and to practice by demonstrating institutional investors' activism through the vote in relation to the approval of the executive compensation package. Furthermore, the determinants demonstrate how company-wide variables affect the approval of compensation packages.
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Conyon, M. J., & He, L. (2011). Executive compensation and corporate governance in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(4), 1158-1175. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.006
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Conyon, M., & Sadler, G. (2010). Shareholder voting and directors' remuneration report legislation: Say on pay in the UK. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18(4), 296-312. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00802.x
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Crisóstomo, V. L., & González, E. V. (2006). Possível estratégia de ativismo de fundos de pensão no Brasil. Revista de Economia Contemporânea, 10(1), 139-155. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1590/S1415-98482006000100006
Croci, E., Gonenc, H., & Ozkan, N. (2012). CEO compensation, family control, and institutional investors in Continental Europe. Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(12), 3318-3335. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.07.017
Cucari, N. (2019). Determinants of say on pay vote: a configurational analysis. International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, 15(3), 837-856. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11365-018-0556-x
Cuñat, V., Gine, M., & Guadalupe, M. (2016). Say pays! Shareholder voice and firm performance. Review of Finance, 20(5), 1799-1834. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfv056
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Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F., & Oesch, D. (2013). Shareholder votes and proxy advisors: Evidence from say on pay. Journal of Accounting Research, 51(5), 951-996. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12024
Falco, S. E., Cucari, N., & Sorrentino, E. (2016). Voting dissent and corporate governance structures: The role of say on pay in a comparative analysis. Corporate Ownership & Control, 13(4), 188-196. Doi: https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv13i4c1p12
Ferri, F., & Maber, D. A. (2013). Say on pay votes and CEO compensation: Evidence from the UK. Review of Finance, 17(2), 527-563. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfs003
Ferri, M. S., & Soares, R. O. (2009). Investidores institucionais e o foco no curto prazo: um estudo nas empresas negociadas na Bovespa. Contabilidade Vista & Revista, 20(4), 15-30.
Firth, M., Fung, P. M., & Rui, O. M. (2006). Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(4), 693-714. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.03.002
Firth, M., Fung, P. M., & Rui, O. M. (2007). How ownership and corporate governance influence chief executive pay in China's listed firms. Journal of Business Research, 60(7), 776-785. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2007.01.014
Gillan, S. L., & Starks, L. T. (2000). Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: The role of institutional investors. Journal of financial Economics, 57(2), 275-305. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00058-1
Gillan, S. L., & Starks, L. T. (2007). The evolution of shareholder activism in the United States. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 19(1), 55-73. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2007.00125.x
Gillan, Stuart L. and Starks, Laura T. (1998). A Survey of Shareholder Activism: Motivation and Empirical Evidence. Available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.663523
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Goergen, Marc; Renneboog, Luc. (2011). Managerial compensation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(4), 1068-1077. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.06.002
Grosse, M., Kean, S., & Scott, T. (2017). Shareholder say on pay and CEO compensation: three strikes and the board is out. Accounting & Finance, 57(3), 701-725. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12176
Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T. (2003). Institutional investors and executive compensation. The journal of finance, 58(6), 2351-2374. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1540-6261.2003.00608.x
Holanda, A. P., Rebouças, S. M. D. P., & Coelho, A. C. D. (2013). Gerenciamento de resultados e presença de investidores institucionais nas firmas brasileiras. Contexto, 13(25).
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2022-04-23
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Rissatti, J. C., Borba, J. A., Martins Dias Maragno, L., & Paulo, E. (2022). Empirical evidence of factors that influence the approval of the executive compensation package by shareholders. Journal of Education and Research in Accounting (REPeC), 16(1). https://doi.org/10.17524/repec.v16i1.2959
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